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Abstract
Out of a total of 2,976 double tax agreements (DTAs), some 60% are signed
between a developing and a developed economy. As DTAs shift taxing rights from
capital importing to capital exporting countries, the prior would incur a loss. We
demonstrate in a theoretical model that in a deal one country does not trump the
other, but that the deal must be mutually beneficial. In the case of an asym-
metric DTA, this requires compensation from the capital exporting country to the
capital importing country. We provide empirical evidence that such compensation
is indeed paid, for instance in the form of bilateral official development assistance,
which increases on average by six million US$ in the year of the signature of a DTA.
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1 Introduction
With rising cross-border capital flows, the interaction of national tax jurisdic-
tions has increasingly gained in relevance in the last decades. Given the lack of
a unified global tax order and the so far limited scope of multilateral initiatives,
the tax treatment of cross-border activities remains to a large degree regulated
by bilateral double taxation agreements (DTAs).1 These agreements set tax rules
and allocate taxing rights between the two signatory states.
Of the 2,976 DTAs in place as of 2010, some 500 DTAs covered relationships
between OECD countries (17% of the total). About a third of the treaties were
signed between two developing economies, and more than 50% were between a
developing on the one hand and an OECD country on the other hand [Baker,
2014]. This latter category, so-called asymmetric DTAs, are the focus of this
paper.
The large majority of DTAs is drafted along either the OECD or the U.N. Model
Tax Conventions (MTC) [Wijnen and de Goede, 2014]. Both these conventions
(albeit the U.N. Convention to a lesser degree) tend to shift taxing powers from
the source state, i.e. the state where income is generated, to the residence state of
a company. For two countries with largely symmetrical investment patterns this
imbalance is not problematic.
Conversely, when two countries with an asymmetric investment position sign
such a DTA, this shifting of taxing powers inherently implies a loss of tax base
for the capital-importing country [see e.g. Rixen and Schwarz, 2009]. With capital
still flowing predominantly from industrialized to developing countries and capital
income flowing the other way, such agreements may thus put capital-importing
developing countries at a disadvantage.
This raises the question as to why capital-importing countries sign such DTAs.
1A multilateral instrument for the streamlining of DTAs has recently been proposed by the
OECD in the framework of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project.
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Several reasons have been brought forward. Most prominently, it has been argued
that developing countries expect increased capital-inflows after the signature of
DTAs [e.g. Lang and Owens, 2014]. Empirical evidence as to whether DTAs indeed
lead to higher investment flows is, however, far from conclusive [see e.g. Baker,
2014]. From a policy perspective, Pickering [2013] argues that capital exporting
countries have a higher bargaining power and thus can pressure capital-importers
into signing DTAs.
In this paper, we propose a further explanation. We argue that capital ex-
porters use foreign aid to incite capital-importers into signing DTAs. We claim
that capital importers that sign a DTA are compensated through official develop-
ment assistance (ODA). We regard this not as an alternative but as an additional
mechanism to explain the signing of DTAs between countries with unbalanced
investment patterns.
The strategic use of ODA as a foreign policy instrument has been documented
in various contexts. Alesina and Dollar [2000] argue that the allocation of foreign
aid can – to a large extent – be explained by political and strategic factors. They
find a positive association between the amounts of bilateral aid a country receives
and its alignment with the respective donor country’s voting behaviour at the U.N.
General Assembly. Kuziemko and Werker [2006] find that U.S. and U.N. aid flows
to the rotating members of the United Nations Security Council rise significantly
during the two-year period of their Security Council membership. The authors
argue that the patterns found are best explained through strategic vote buying.
In addition, temporary members of the United Nations Security Council are found
to benefit from more programs from the International Monetary Fund (and from
programs with more favourable conditions) [Dreher et al., 2009b]. Further, Dippel
[2015] provides evidence of the strategic use of ODA by major donors in order to
influence or reward voting behaviour in the International Whaling Organization.
Similarly, analysing the political economy of aid in donor and recipient coun-
tries theoretically and empirically, de Mesquita and Smith [2009] conclude that
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OECD countries’ bilateral giving is only to a small degree motivated by humani-
tarian motives. Faye and Niehaus [2012] find that in election years, donors try to
actively influence election outcomes in recipient countries by disbursing additional
aid to closely aligned governments. Kersting and Kilby [2016] find evidence of
global electioneering that specifically serves U.S. foreign policy interests.
Empirical evidence thus illustrates that besides the humanitarian needs of re-
cipient countries, also strategic interests of donor countries determine the allo-
cation of foreign aid. While evidence for this quid-pro-quo view has been found
in various contexts, interestingly, so far the literature has not inquired into the
question as to whether ODA is used as a strategic instrument in the bargaining of
bilateral treaties.
With regards to bilateral tax treaties, due to their benefits being predominantly
on the side of capital-exporting countries, a number of legal and economic scholars
have pleaded for the inclusion of revenue sharing mechanisms into DTAs between
countries with asymmetric investment positions [e.g. Paolini et al., 2015, Thuronyi,
2010]. To our knowledge, potential connections between DTAs and existing foreign
aid payments have, however, only been addressed by Braun and Zagler [2014]. In
a pure cross-section study for 2010 the authors find a positive association between
bilateral ODA commitments and the existence of DTAs.
The present paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of foreign
aid by providing evidence that foreign aid is used strategically to put pressure
on or reward recipient countries when it comes to negotiating bilateral treaties
from which the donor country typically benefits more than the recipient country.
We examine DTAs that are signed between donor and recipient countries between
1991 and 2012. Using a fixed effects poisson model, we find that on average,
donor countries’ aid commitments to the other signature state increase by about
22% in the year of signature. Evaluated at the sample mean, this translates into
around six million USD additional aid commitments in a DTA signatory year. We
interpret this increase in ODA as compensation for DTA signature.
4
This finding is important because it shows a new dimension and a further
channel in which foreign aid may be used as a strategic policy instrument. From
this perspective, this paper additionally contributes to the discussion regarding the
efficiency of aid, since it is heavily dependent on its allocation [Faye and Niehaus,
2012].
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly discusses the institu-
tional background of asymmetric DTAs. In Section 3, we set up a simple Nash
bargaining model analyzing the supply of tax-related information as provided for
in bilateral tax treaties. After describing the data and methodology in Sections 4
and 5, we empirically test the model hypothesis that bilateral foreign aid is used as
a strategic instrument to reward countries for their agreeing to sign a DTA (Section
6). Section 7 presents a series of robustness checks and Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Background: Asymmetric DTAs
Foremost, DTAs serve to allocate taxing powers between signatory states in or-
der to prevent double taxation in cross-border situations. In addition, DTAs are
increasingly seen as instruments to prevent double non-taxation of international
economic activities. For instance, DTAs include anti-abuse provisions and enable
or facilitate the exchange of information and administrative assistance between
tax authorities of the two signatory states. Overall, DTAs are signed in order to
increase tax certainty for companies engaged in international business (for instance
multinational enterprises) and to ensure efficient tax collection for signatory states.
Most DTAs are based on the Model Tax Conventions (MTC) proposed by the
OECD and the U.N. and thus are very similar. The fact that the same underly-
ing principles are embodied in all treaties makes them especially suitable for our
analysis. This ensures that we have a large number of similar treaties from which
we can generally expect similar effects and thus can treat them equally in the
5
empirical analysis.2
How do DTAs specifically allocate taxing rights between the two signatory
states? Generally, DTAs distinguish two types of income, for which different al-
location rules apply: active business income and passive income. Active business
income simply means business profits. The primary right to tax is with the resi-
dence country. Only when a (multinational) company has a substantial business
presence (e.g. a fixed place of business) – a so-called permanent establishment
(PE) – in the other state, then the other state has the right to tax the profits
attributable to the PE (Article 7 OECD MTC). The residence country is then
obliged to prevent double taxation by applying the exemption or credit method as
provided for in Article 23 of the OECD MTC.
Thus, the definition of a PE and the method of defining the income to be
allocated to a PE decide on which state is allowed to tax the respective income.
The OECD MTC (and the UN MTC, albeit to a lesser extent) generally shifts
taxing powers from the source to the residence country by defining both a PE and
the income attributable to the PE more narrowly than many national legislations
– especially in developing countries [see e.g. Braun and Fuentes, 2016].
When it comes to passive income, i.e. dividends, royalties, and interest pay-
ments, the residence country has the primary right to tax, and the source country
is granted the right to levy limited withholding tax rates on these types of in-
come (see Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD MTC). Typically, DTAs provide
2This should, however, not conceal that DTAs are the outcome of bilateral negotiations. This
concerns not only the decision as of whether or not two states enter into a DTA, but also the
propositions of the individual articles. Analysing U.S. and German DTAs respectively, Chisik
and Davies [2004] and Rixen and Schwarz [2009] find that these two countries agree on higher
withholding tax rates in DTAs when investment positions are more asymmetric. Rixen and
Schwarz [2009] also find that the definition of permanent establishments is generally broader in
asymmetric treaties. These two findings imply that, in comparison with DTAs between countries
with more symmetric investment patterns, asymmetric treaties leave more taxing power with the
source country. Source countries thus seem to have some bargaining power. At the same time,
the pervasiveness of specific UN Model provisions in DTAs is found to be surprisingly small. In a
comprehensive overview study, Wijnen and de Goede [2014] find that 21 of the specific provisions
proposed by the UN MTC are included in less than 40% of the DTAs concluded between 1997
and 2012.
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for a reduction of withholding tax rates in the source state, which implies “a rev-
enue transfer from the net capital importer to the net capital exporter”[Rixen and
Schwarz, 2009, p. 446]. Analysing a sample of 18 European countries’ DTAs with
developing countries, Eurodad [2016] finds that the withholding tax rates on divi-
dends, royalties, and interest stipulated in these DTAs are on average 3.8% lower
than the respective rates in domestic laws.3
A number of case studies discusses such problematic features inherent in DTAs
in great detail and attempts to quantify their impact on developing countries.4
Asymmetric DTAs, i.e. DTAs signed between capital-exporters and capital-im-
porters, which are based on OECD MTC (and to a lesser degree also the ones based
on the UN MTC) thus imply inherent downsides for capital-importing countries
by limiting their taxing powers [see e.g. Dagan, 2000, Daurer, 2013, Rixen and
Schwarz, 2009].
Due to rapidly growing interdependencies between economies, the exchange of
information has gained more and more importance for respective tax authorities.
Particularly multinationals’ cross-border activities raise the awareness, since the
majority of national tax systems are residence-based. Furthermore, individual
source taxation rates have declined over recent years. Therefore the monitoring of
taxpayers’ international activities, followed by a correct assessment of tax liabilities
is crucial.
While the tax authorities of capital-exporting economies typically have a greater
interest in receiving tax-related information, also net capital importing countries
benefit from the exchange of information in tax matters. Tax authorities from
low-income countries are often interested in requesting information regarding the
capital of their high net worth individuals parked abroad. Additionally, firms res-
ident in developing countries are increasingly becoming international. Outward
3Eurodad [2016, p. 23].
4see e.g. Braun and Fuentes [2016] for a case study on Austria’s DTA network with developing
countries, McGauran [2013] for a case study on the Netherlands’ tax treaties with developing
countries, and Buergi and Meyer-Nandi [2013] for an analysis of Swiss tax treaties with developing
countries, ActionAid [2014] for a survey of Uganda’s DTAs.
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foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developing and transition economies
have been increasing, and in 2015 made up 27.7% of global FDI outflows. How-
ever, in the same year, the combined outward FDI stocks from developing and
transition countries only amounted to 22.4% of worldwide outward FDI stocks. 5
In the majority of cases, the (net) information flow mainly flows from the
low-income country to the high-income country.6 Given that retrieving and pro-
viding such information is costly, the increased demand for information may thus
aggravate the structural disadvantages arising from DTAs for capital-importing
countries. The next section formally illustrates the implicit disadvantage in DTAs
and why compensation is expected in case of a voluntary signature of a DTA
between two countries with an asymmetric investment position.
3 The model
If a resident (corporation) in one country (country R henceforth) pursues economic
activities in another country (country S to indicate the source of income) that are
liable to taxation in its country of residence, this country requires information on
the tax base and the amount of taxes due. There are several ways to obtain this
information. First, the tax authority can ask the tax subject herself. For obvi-
ous reasons,7 the tax authority may not receive the correct reply. As opposed to
economic activity in its own territory, the tax authority in country R cannot inves-
tigate abroad due to a lack of jurisdiction. However, it can ask the tax authorities
5UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database www.unctad.org/fdistatistics
6There is only very limited data available on the bilateral information flows between tax
authorities. The Peer Review Reports published by the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes reveal the respective numbers only for very few non-
OECD countries. For instance, the OECD Peer Review Report for Malaysia shows that the
country received 61 requests of information between 2010 and 2012 and sent only one request
during the same time period [OECD, 2014, p. 105 and 134]. The Philippines received 67 requests
of information regarding direct taxation between 2009 and 2012, while they sent only two requests
to other tax authorities in the same years [OECD, 2013, p. 101].
7By understating the tax base, the subject would reduce her tax burden without a possibility
for the authorities to check the validity of the statement.
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abroad to assist in verifying the information of its tax subject. Country S may be
reluctant to supply this type of information, due to direct and indirect costs. Di-
rect costs obviously include information collection and audit costs. Indirect costs
are effects that impact country S, as agents will require excess withholding taxes
back as a next step, or move their business to a third country, thus withdrawing
tax base and foreign direct investment from country S, leading to repercussions on
GDP and employment. Country S will therefore supply very little information to
other jurisdictions. In order to circumvent this difficulty, an incentive compatible
contract can be signed between the two countries R and S.
We assume that country R can tax foreign income with a constant average tax
rate τ , so that every unit of tax base information q has the same value to country
R. We can think of τ as the reservation price above which country R would no
longer be willing to purchase information. Country S, by contrast, has different
costs of information procurement, starting at nothing (in case the information is
readily available, and decreasing in the size of the economic activity (the larger
the economic activity the easier it should be per unit), and the complexity of
the underlying business activity. We will rank information according to their
procurement cost for country S, from the cheapest to the most costly,8 according
to the following cost function,
C = c(q) (1)
with c(q) ≥ 0, dc/dq = c˙(q) ≥ 0. We define average costs as C/q = c(q)/q = a(q).
There is a rent of information sharing (and hence the possibility of a mutually
beneficial deal) if and only if the maximum willingness to pay of country R exceeds
the marginal cost of procurement of country S,
c˙(q) ≤ τ (2)
Suppose for a moment that information could be provided and demanded by many
8For the sake of simplicity, we assume full divisibility of information.
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different agents. This would lead to perfect competition in a market for infor-
mation, and information would be exchanged until equation (2) is satisfied with
equality, and, due to perfectly elastic demand, the price for information would be
equal to the gain for country R from the information, ppc = τ . This is the exact
opposite of the current practice in DTAs, where information may be shared free
of charge, pdta = 0. Note that in the latter case, Country S would willingly share
only information that comes at no cost, and this may be the reason for the low
number of information exchanges registered empirically.
We are, however, not in a situation of perfect competition. As a specific piece
of tax information is only available to country S, and only useful to country R,
the two governments would need to negotiate over that piece of information. We
will therefore use Nash bargaining to solve for the price at which information
would be voluntarily shared by country S and voluntarily purchased by country
R. We can define the surplus for country R as the difference between the gain
from information, τq, minus the price paid for that information, pq,
UR = (τ − p)q (3)
Similarly, the surplus for country S is equal to the revenue from selling information,
pq, minus the cost of information procurement, C,
US = pq − c(q) (4)
This defines a bargaining problem [Rubinstein, 1982], where upon agreement a
quantity of information q is exchanged at price p leading to the surpluses UR and
US as defined above, whereas under disagreement no information is exchanged,
q = 0. Defining the bargaining power of country R with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, the Nash
maximand reads,
N = (UR)
β(US)
1−β = (τ − p)βqβ[pq − c(q)]1−β (5)
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where both UR and US must be positive, or a(q) ≤ p ≤ τ . Taking the first order
condition with respect to the price p gives,
−β(τ − p)β−1qβ[pq − c(q)]1−β + (1− β)(τ − p)βqβ+1[pq − c(q)]−β = 0
Upon rearranging, we find the bargaining price,
p = βa(q) + (1− β)τ (6)
It turns out that the result is a weighted average between the reservation price of
country R, τ , and the average cost of providing this information, a(q∗), for country
S. The price will equal the reservation price of country R, p = τ if its bargaining
power is null, β = 0. In this case country S can extract all rents for itself. The
price will equal average costs of country S if its bargaining power is null, β → 1.
In this case country R can extract all rents for itself.
The price will be null if and only if average costs are zero and the bargaining
power β equals unity. Coincidentally, this is the current legal situation in Tax
Information Exchange Agreements and Double Tax Treaties with provisions for
the exchange of information. Whilst this may not pose a problem in situations
where both countries posses a similar amount of information9, when the countries
are asymmetric, with one country the predominant provider of information and
the other country the predominant receiver, the above model predicts little to no
information to be exchanged, if average costs of acquiring information are non-
negligible, as argued above. This asymmetric situation is typical for developing
countries, which are capital importers and therefore should be able to retrieve
information requested by the capital exporting developed country. We therefore
suggest that TIEAs and DTAs should include cost10 and revenue sharing to succeed
9In two separate bargaining problems, neither country would be willing to provide information
that comes at a cost, but in a joint bargaining problem, our educated guess is that information
will be exchanged voluntarily.
10As mentioned above, costs are opportunity costs and include both direct and indirect costs.
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in retrieving information.
Maximizing equation (5) with respect to the amount of information exchanged
q yields,
β(τ − p)βqβ−1[pq − c(q)]1−β + (1− β)(τ − p)βqβ[pq − c(q)]−β[p− c˙(q)] = 0
Simplifying and rearranging yields,
p = βa(q) + (1− β)c˙(q) (7)
which differs from the bargaining outcome (6) only in the last term. From equa-
tions (6) and (7) we can conclude that the quantity of information exchanged in a
Nash bargaining is therefore given by c˙(q∗) = τ , and is equivalent to the amount of
information exchanged under perfect competition (2). Nash bargaining therefore
does not distort the optimal amount of information exchanged. We can infer the
quantity of information exchanged by invoking the inverse of equation (2),
q∗ = c˙−1(τ) (8)
Figure 1 illustrates the argument. We have depicted the reservation price of coun-
try R as a horizontal green line. We have also drawn the marginal cost curve
of country S as an upward sloping red line. At the intersection of these two
curves, point B, we identify the quantity of information exchanged in the bargain-
ing model. Finally, we have drawn three different average cost curves of country
R, which differ only in the amount of fixed costs. a2(q) has a minimum above
the reservation price, and hence there exists no solution where information is ex-
changed.
The average cost curve a1(q) has its minimum below the reservation price, and
therefore permits the exchange of information.11 The minimum amount at which
11Bargaining will not lead to the maximum amount of information exchanged, which would
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Figure 1: Nash Bargaining over Information Exchange
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country S is willing to sell information is indicated by point A. The difference
between A and B indicates the total economic rent that can be gained from bar-
gaining. The division of this rent depends on relative bargaining power. If country
S has all the bargaining power, β = 0, according to equation (6), the exchange
would happen in point B. If country R has all the bargaining power, β → 1, the
price would be set at point A. In both cases, the price exceeds zero.
The only possibility to have exchange of information at zero cost is depicted by
average cost a0(q), where fixed costs and marginal costs below a certain threshold
q0 are null.
12 Here, if country R has all the bargaining power, the bargaining
outcome would be a corner solution, and a quantity q0 of information would be
exchanged at a prize p = 0. In this case, information exchange is inefficient, as
country R would be willing to pay for additional information and country S would
be willing to provide additional information at that price.
We have thus established that in an asymmetric DTA, there should be a com-
pensation for countryR by country S. We can identify the amount of compensation
be where the average cost curve a1(q) intersects the reservation price τ . Instead, information is
exchanged at a lower level, as additional cost for providing information exceeds the willingness
to pay. Information exchange in a bargaining model is therefore efficient.
12This case is hypothetical, as costs of acquiring information are typically non negligible.
13
paid simply by multiplying price with quantity and substituting equation(6),
pq∗ = βc(q∗) + (1− β)τq∗ (9)
In the following section, we aim to find evidence in support of this theory of
compensation. Whilst there is no DTA that explicitly includes compensation, we
test whether there is implicit compensation in place. Compensation may come in
many forms. One possibility can be foreign aid paid by the information receiving
country to the information provider. We will therefore look at official development
assistance (ODA) as an - albeit imperfect - measure of compensation for signing
a treaty.
Compensation depends on three elements: the optimal quantity of information
exchanged, bargaining power, and the reservation price, given by the tax rate in
the country of residence R. An increase in the amount of information exchanged
itself depends on several factors as indicated above (8), but ceteris paribus we can
ascertain that,
∂pq∗
∂q∗
= βc˙(q∗) + (1− β)τ = τ > 0 (10)
We may imagine that the stronger the economic relation between two countries as
measured by trade or FDI flows is, the larger will be the amount of compensation.
It is straightforward to see that an increase in the bargaining power of country R
reduces the amount of compensation,
∂pq∗
∂β
= c(q∗)− τq∗ < 0 (11)
Bargaining power can be approximated by the size of a country (population or
GDP).13
Finally, an increase in the reservation price of country R has an impact on
compensation both directly and indirectly by altering the quantity of information
13Or the presence of a Donald Trump in the negotiation team. We will use country fixed effects
to control for the latter.
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exchanged,
∂pq∗
∂τ
= (1− β)q∗ + τ
c¨(q∗)
(12)
where c¨(q∗) is the second derivative of the cost function and ambiguous of sign,
so that we cannot draw any conclusions on the impact of the residence country’s
reservation price on the amount of compensation.
4 Data
We construct a dyadic panel dataset that consists of country-pairs with an ODA
donor country on the one hand and an ODA recipient country on the other hand.
The analysis covers the period 1991 to 2012. The list of donors includes the
23 states that were DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members as of
2012 (see Table 3 in the Annex). Apart from Greece, that joined the DAC in
1999, and the Republic of Korea, that joined in 2010, all other countries were
members during the entire sample period.14 The recipient countries comprise of
the countries included in the 2012 DAC list of potential ODA recipients, which
encompasses low and middle income countries according to the 2012 World Bank
income classification. We use bilateral foreign aid commitments as our dependent
variable. Information on ODA commitments has been sourced from the OECD
DAC database.
As we are interested in the question as to whether ODA is used by donor
countries to compensate potential recipient countries when signing a DTA, our
main variable of interest concerns DTAs. Information on DTA signatures is taken
from the IBFD Tax Research Platform. Between 1991 and 2012, 372 DTAs were
signed between 23 donor and 75 recipient countries. 24 of these DTAs are not
included in the empirical analysis because there are no aid commitments within
these country-pairs in the years analysed. The final sample used in the regression
14Table 9 shows regressions results excluding these two countries as donor countries. The
results remain unchanged.
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Figure 2: DTA signatures 1991-2012
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Datasource: IBFD Taxation Platform, own illustration
analysis, which is further reduced due to missing data in the covariates, includes
327 DTA signatures between 21 donor countries and 69 recipient countries.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of these DTA signatures over the sample period.
The number of yearly DTA signatures ranges between four in 2011 and 27 in 1995
and 1996. On average, 14.8 DTAs were signed each year, with a higher average
number of yearly signatures in the 1990s than in the following years.
The analysis includes all DAC donor countries as of 2012 with the exception of
Ireland and Portugal (see Figure 3). These two countries signed DTAs but did not
commit to any aid to the other signatory states during the sample period. During
the 22 years covered by the analysis, each donor country signed on average 15.6
DTAs. The number of new DTAs per donor country varies between three (New
Zealand) and 27 new treaties (Switzerland).
The majority of the recipient countries are middle income countries. 170 DTAs
with upper middle income countries, and 131 with lower middle income countries,
and only 26 DTAs with low income countries are covered by the analysis. Table 4
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Figure 3: DTA signatures per donor country 1991-2012
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Datasource: IBFD Taxation Platform, own illustration
in the Annex presents a complete list of recipient countries with their respective
number of treaties concluded between 1991 and 2012 that are included in the
analysis.
Geographically, the main area covered is Europe and Central Asia (104 of the
analysed DTAs), followed by Asia & Pacific (77 DTAs) and Sub Saharan Africa
(59 DTAs). In addition, the analysis includes 50 DTAs with Latin America and
the Caribbean and 37 DTAs with countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
The explanatory variable of interest is a binary variable, taking the value of one
if a country-pair signs a DTA in a particular year and is otherwise zero. We will
include leads and lags of this variable to ensure that the relationship is not coinci-
dental. We will also compare the results with a level dummy of DTAs that jumps
from zero to unity onwards from the year the DTA is signed. We further include
other international treaties, such as preferential trade agreements and bilateral
investment treaties. Finally, we include the factors which are generally found to
matter for donors when allocating foreign aid: population, poverty, proximity, and
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policies [Clist, 2011].
5 Methodology
We question as to whether ODA is used by donor countries to compensate po-
tential recipient countries when signing a DTA. To analyse this hypothesis, we
use bilateral foreign aid commitments as our dependent variable. Information on
ODA commitments comes from the OECD DAC database. The typical distribu-
tion of bilateral aid with the large number of zero observations poses a challenge
for regression analysis. Log-linearized gravity-type OLS models with fixed effects
are not the most suitable models for this kind of data. Not only do these models
require an arbitrary adjustment of the dependent variable, but, in the presence
of heteroskedasticity, the estimates are inconsistent, and their interpretation can
be misleading, even when robust standard errors are applied [Silva and Tenreyro,
2006].
Instead, Silva and Tenreyro [2006] suggest the use of fixed effect poisson models
(FEPM). These models explicitly take the non-linearity of the dependent variable
into account, are robust to heteroskedasticity, and control for unobserved hetero-
geneity. Moreover, in FEPM, the dependent variable does not need to follow a
Poisson distribution, nor does it need to be an integer number. For the estimator
to be consistent, only the correct specification of the conditional mean is required.
In addition, and very importantly in our case, the FEPM also performs well un-
der a large number of zero observations in the dependent variable. Besides, the
parameter estimates can be directly interpreted as elasticities [Silva and Tenreyro,
2006, 2011].
As bilateral trade shows a similar data structure of (excess) zeros in the depen-
dent variable and the presence of heteroskedasticity in constant elasticity models,
the international trade literature has widely used FEPM models [Silva and Ten-
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reyro, 2006].15 Using a FEPM, we therefore analyse the connection between ODA
commitments and the signature of a DTA. The regression model, which is esti-
mated using the maximum likelihood method, takes the following form:
ODAijt = exp(αij + β ∗ DTAijt + γ ∗ Xijt−1 + θij + ηt) + εijt (13)
Total bilateral ODA commitments (in constant USD) are the dependent vari-
able. The explanatory variable of interest is DTAijt, a binary variable taking the
value of one if a country-pair ij signs a DTA in year t. Additional control vari-
ables (Xijt−1) are lagged by one period. Country-pair fixed effects (θij), year-fixed
effects (ηt) , and a constant αij are included, and εijt stands for the error term.
6 Empirical evidence
Column (1) in Table 1 includes all 2,434 country-pairs for which we have collected
data. Besides including a DTA dummy variable, we account for the factors which
are generally found to matter for donors when allocating foreign aid: population,
poverty, proximity, and policies [Clist, 2011].16 We will now describe these control
15Even though the aid literature mostly uses OLS regression models, there are exceptions.
Kersting and Kilby [2016], for instance, employ OLS and Tobit regressions with logged ODA
commitments as the dependent variable. However, consistent Tobit estimation relies on strong
assumptions, including (i) a normally distributed and homoskedastic error term, (ii) explanatory
variables affecting the dependent variable equally along the extensive and intensive margin, and
(iii) due to the incidental parameters problem a FE estimation of the Tobit model is not feasible
[Bittschi et al., 2016]). Another strategy in order to keep the zero observations is followed by
Dippel [2015]. Instead of logged ODA values, he uses the absolute ODA values as a dependent
variable. de Mesquita and Smith [2009] use a logit model to analyse the binary question as of
whether or not aid is given to a specific country. Barthel also uses a two-part model with a first
stage random effects probit model and a second stage with OLS estimations. Studying a slightly
different question, namely which factors determine whether aid is given directly to the recipient
country’s government or whether it is given to non-state actors in the recipient country, Dietrich
[2013] uses probit and poisson regressions.
16Complete descriptive statistics are depicted in Table 6 in the Annex and the sources of the
data are depicted in Table 7 in the Annex.
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Table 1: Baseline Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
POP donor(ln) 3.384** 5.040** 5.047** 5.070** 5.311**
(1.717) (2.075) (2.092) (2.098) (2.133)
POP recipient(ln) 0.954** 0.190 0.172 0.177 0.127
(0.426) (0.743) (0.734) (0.732) (0.750)
GDPPC recipient(ln) -0.122 0.229 0.231 0.233 0.249
(0.170) (0.262) (0.262) (0.261) (0.261)
Bilateral trade (ln) -0.005** -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Democracy freedom 0.050** 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.027
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Investment treaty 0.080 0.286** 0.278** 0.278** 0.304**
(0.088) (0.125) (0.123) (0.122) (0.125)
Trade agreement -0.096 0.005 0.005 0.008 -0.011
(0.115) (0.201) (0.202) (0.203) (0.206)
DTA 0.210 0.003
(0.128) (0.100)
DTA(-3) 0.024 0.020
(0.140) (0.145)
DTA(-2) -0.138 -0.132
(0.146) (0.147)
DTA(-1) -0.032 -0.030
(0.124) (0.128)
DTA(0) 0.215** 0.219** 0.207**
(0.087) (0.092) (0.093)
DTA(+1) 0.063 0.067
(0.120) (0.122)
DTA(+2) 0.026 0.015
(0.074) (0.076)
DTA(+3) 0.131 0.125
(0.089) (0.091)
Observations 51,332 7,006 7,006 7,006 6,598
Number of groups 2,434 327 327 327 308
Wald chi2 218.27 202.82 206.90 244.84 256.37
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo Log-likelihood -540,742.47 -72,846.18 -72,658.12 -72,516.80 -69,452.28
Notes: Estimated with Poisson Maximum Likelihood Fixed Effects. The dependent variable is
total bilateral ODA commitments; all explanatory variables are lagged by one period; all regres-
sions include country-pair FE, year FE, and a constant; robust standard errors in parentheses;
time period 1991 - 2012; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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variables.
First, as a measure of country size, we include the (logged) populations of the
donor and recipient countries (POP donor(ln) and POP recipient(ln)). Both
variables are positive and significant, implying that, on average and ceteris paribus,
larger countries give more aid, and larger countries also receive more aid.
Second, to proxy poverty and the needs of the recipient countries, their re-
spective (logged) levels of GDP per capita (in constant USD) are included in the
analysis (GDPPC recipient(ln)). The estimation results suggest that poverty is
not a statistically significant determinant of foreign aid - at least for our sample
of country-pairs and the time period analysed.
Third, traditional measures of proximity such as distance between the two
signatory states, a common colonial history or a common official language are
captured by the country-pair fixed effects in our estimations. Additionally, we
specifically account for economic ties between the two signatory states by adding
the relative volume of bilateral trade to measure the ”economic distance” between
two countries: ln(trade/gdp). Bilateral trade is measured as the sum of imports
of country i from country j plus the imports of country j from country i in year
t (in constant USD). The absolute volume is then scaled by the sum of the GDPs
of both countries (also measured in constant USD). This variable turns out to be
negative, but statistically insignificant in most regressions.
Forth, when deciding to which countries to allocate how much aid, also recipient
countries’ policies have been found to matter for donors. The variable Democracy
represents the combined score of the civil liberty and political rights indicators
as provided by the Freedom House. Inverted scores have been used to make the
interpretation more intuitive, i.e. higher scores stand for more democratic regimes.
The variable is positive and significant, meaning that countries with higher levels
of democracy tend to receive more foreign aid.
Finally, we include three distinct international treaty dummies, for bilateral in-
vestment treaties, preferential trade agreements and double tax agreements (DTA),
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which each switch from zero to one starting in the year in which a respective treaty
is signed, in order to ensure that the effect of the DTA is not confounded with
the effects of other international treaties. All of these variables turn out to be
statistically insignificant. As preferential trade agreements are typically multilat-
eral agreements, bilateral compensation as proxied by an increase in bilateral aid
is unlikely to be expected. With respect to DTAs and investment treaties, given
that these treaties are typically very persistent (there are only few instances of
treaties being terminated), a long-term effect on the level of ODA after their sig-
nature (as measured by these dummy variables) does not seem very likely. Rather,
a temporary effect around the signatory date seems more plausible if this increase
is to be interpreted as a compensation. Thus, as we are ultimately interested in
the connection between DTA signatures and foreign aid, we restrict our sample to
those country-pairs that have signed a DTA during the sample period from 1991
to 2012 in Column (2).17
Column (2) shows the results when we restrict the sample to country-pairs that
have signed a DTA during the sample period. Aid recipient characteristics turn
out to be irrelevant, as population (of the recipient), poverty, proximity (trade)
and policy turn insignificant. By contrast, ODA is used as a policy instrument by
donor countries that seem to value political commitment – as is expressed through
the positive coefficient on Investment treaty. In addition, in Column (3) we include
DTA(0), which is a dummy variable that is 1 only in the year where a DTA is
signed and zero otherwise. This variable is positive and statistically significant,
meaning that in the year a developing country signs a DTA with a DAC donor
country, the developing country receives 21.5% more aid from that specific donor
country. We thus have a clear indication of compensation for signing a DTA.
This compensation may however not only be given in the year a DTA is signed,
17We have looked at investment treaties, preferential trade agreements and DTA in this setting.
However, for investment treaties and trade agreements the results are inconclusive. This is not
very surprising, as investment treaties and trade agreements may benefit host countries just as
much or more as residence countries, so it is unclear whether and in which direction compensation
should flow.
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but may work as a means of pressure or incentive during the negotiation phase or
as a reward in the years after the agreement. We therefore look at bilateral aid
commitments three years before and after the signature of each DTA. Six years
seem to be a good time frame as it typically takes a few years from the start of
the negotiations to the actual entry into force of a DTA.18 To analyse the dynamic
effects of the signing of a DTA, we include the DTA variable and its three leads
and lags in the regression:
ODAijt = exp(αij +
+3∑
−3
(βkDTAij(t+k)) + γ ∗ Xijt−1 + θij + ηt) + εijt (14)
Column (4) of Table 1 shows the results, and Figure 4 depicts the coefficients
of the DTA variable and its leads and lags. Bilateral aid commitments tend to
be lower during the three years prior to the signature of a DTA (this effect is
however not statistically significant at conventional levels). Donor countries seem
to hold back (or reduce) bilateral aid commitments, possibly to put pressure on
the recipient country to sign the treaty.
In the signatory year, the recipient country is compensated by an increase in
bilateral ODA commitments by 22%. This effect is similar in size and consistently
significant in all specifications. Evaluated at the sample mean, this corresponds
to around six million USD of bilateral aid commitments that can on average be
attributed to a DTA signature. Over all 327 DTAs signed during the sample
period, this adds up to roughly 2 billion USD.
As capital-exporting countries disproportionately benefit from DTAs, our con-
clusions rely on the argument that donor countries typically are capital-exporting
countries and recipient countries are capital-importing countries. Looking at bi-
lateral average investment stocks over the sample period from the perspective of
18Based on a random sample of 30 country-pairs, Ligthart et al. [2012] calculate that on average
2.3 years lie between the ratification and implementation of a DTA.
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Figure 4: DTA signature and bilateral ODA
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Plotted coefficients of the DTA signature indicator variable (DTA(0)) and its three leads and
lags with 95% confidence intervals (corresponding to Column 4 in Table 1).
the donor country, the outward FDI stocks exceeded the inward stocks for 223
country-pairs, corresponding to 68.2% of our sample. For 25% of the sample, or
85 country-pairs, the average net investment positions were zero, and in only 19
cases the average inward stocks were higher than the outward stocks (5.8%).19 In
column (5) of Table 1, we thus delete from the sample the 19 country-pairs for
which the donor country’s outward FDI stocks are inferior to its inward stocks
(on average over the sample period). The result remains unchanged. These 19
country-pairs thus seem not to affect the results.
Our model in Section 3 has generated three testable hypotheses on an increase
in foreign aid around the signature of a DTA, equations (10) to (12). We can there-
fore empirically test the model predictions regarding the role of (i) the strength of
economic ties, (ii) the relative bargaining power of the two countries, and (iii) the
residence country’s reservation price, i.e. its corporate tax rate.
The first hypothesis derived from the model is that stronger economic ties
increase compensation (see Columns (1) and (4) of Table 2). Economic ties be-
19Data on bilateral FDI stocks are taken from the OECD FDI database and are calculated as
outward FDI stocks from donor country i in recipient country j plus inward FDI stocks in donor
country i from recipient country j, both as reported by donor country i.
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Table 2: Testing Model Hypotheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
POP donor(ln) 5.180** 1.060 4.706**
(2.085) (2.489) (2.268)
POP recipient(ln) 0.179 2.423** 0.164
(0.731) (1.067) (0.740)
GDP donor(ln) 2.568*** 2.622*** 2.461***
(0.725) (0.954) (0.780)
GDP recipient(ln) 0.068 0.077
(0.696) (0.713)
GDPPC recipient(ln) 0.213 2.502*** 0.233 0.092 0.098 0.102
(0.255) (0.850) (0.261) (0.711) (0.740) (0.743)
ln(trade/gdp) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Democracy freedom 0.028 0.017 0.029 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Investment treaty 0.283** 0.316*** 0.275** 0.314** 0.312** 0.308**
(0.124) (0.120) (0.126) (0.122) (0.121) (0.124)
Trade agreement -0.003 0.044 0.003 0.044 0.040 0.037
(0.192) (0.195) (0.197) (0.189) (0.195) (0.192)
DTA(0) 0.340** 0.358** 0.250 0.356** 0.357** 0.401
(0.140) (0.146) (0.413) (0.143) (0.145) (0.397)
Bilateral FDI(ln) 0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006)
DTA(0)*FDI 0.019 0.021*
(0.012) (0.012)
GDP ratio 2.302*** -0.078
(0.837) (0.713)
DTA(0)*GDP ratio -0.037 -0.036
(0.034) (0.034)
Corporate tax 0.608 0.403
(1.141) (1.153)
DTA(0)*Corporate tax -0.095 -0.461
(1.143) (1.116)
Observations 6,941 7,006 7,006 6,941 7,006 7,006
Number of groups 327 327 327 327 327 327
Wald chi2 198.86 221.51 208.53 224.19 217.22 220.09
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo Log-likelihood -72,220.38 -71,746.30 -72,630.27 -71,770.78 -71,349.15 -71,771.23
Notes: Estimated with Poisson Maximum Likelihood Fixed Effects. The dependent variable is
total bilateral ODA commitments; all explanatory variables are lagged by one period; all regres-
sions include country-pair FE, year FE, and a constant; robust standard errors in parentheses;
time period 1991 - 2012; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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tween the two countries are proxied by bilateral FDI stocks (Bilateral FDI(ln)).
In Column (1), where country size is proxied by population, the interaction effect
is positive as predicted, but the p-value of the interaction variable lies slightly
above conventional levels of statistical significance (p-value of 0.105). When coun-
try size is measured by the two countries’ GDPs, the interaction effect is positive
and significant at the 10% level (see Column (4)). This suggests that the stronger
the economic ties are between two countries, the more compensation the donor
country is willing to pay for the signature of a DTA. Note that the DTA is only
significant in the interaction term, implying that there is no level effect or lump-
sum compensation, but compensation is only relative to the strength of economic
ties.
The second hypothesis derived from the model is that the higher the relative
bargaining power of the residence country, the lower the compensation for a DTA.
The relative bargaining power is proxied by the ratio of the two countries’ GDPs.
The interaction effect between this GDP-ratio with the DTA variable indicates the
impact of the relative bargaining power on ODA payments for a DTA (see Column
(2) in Table 2). The coefficient has the expected negative sign, is however not
statistically significant. Column (5) shows a similar regression, the only difference
being that country size is measured by the two countries’ GDPs rather than their
populations (the recipient country’s GDP is dropped in this column to avoid perfect
collinearity). Also in this case, the interaction effects hints to a lower compensation
in case of higher relative bargaining power of the donor country, even though the
effect is again not statistically significant.
Finally, in Columns (3) and (6) – the difference between these two columns
again being the different country size measures – we analyse the effect of the
residence country’s corporate income tax rate (Corporate tax ) on the compensation
payout. The model predicts no clear impact, and also the empirical regressions do
not yield a clear result with the interaction effect between the Corporate tax and
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DTA variable being statistically insignificant.20
To sum up, the data supports Hypothesis 1. There is statistical evidence
suggesting that ceteris paribus recipient countries with closer economic ties with
the donor country tend to receive more foreign aid in exchange for a DTA. The
data also do not outrightly contradict the second hypothesis, suggesting that the
higher the relative bargaining power of a residence country, the lower is the price it
is prepared to pay for a DTA. Hypothesis 3, i.e. an unclear effect of the residence
country’s reservation price, is reflected by the insignificant empirical results. Most
importantly, all estimations are in line with our main prediction, i.e. that there is
a price paid for the signature of a DTA.
7 Robustness
Finally, Table 8 shows additional regressions that include additional and alterna-
tive control variables to test whether the results depend on the covariates included.
Firstly, to account for the fact that donors increase their aid to states that are af-
fected by natural disasters, Columns (1) to (3) include the (logged) total number of
persons affected by natural disasters (from the EM-DAT database). The variable
Natural Catastrophe hence proxies the occurrence and strength of devastation of
natural disasters. As humanitarian aid tends to be promised (and given) promptly
without much time delay, the variable is not lagged by one period. Its coefficient
is close to zero and not significant in our regressions, which may be due to the fact
that humanitarian aid represents only a minor fraction of total aid [Qian, 2015].
Secondly, we control for additional political factors that have been found to
affect foreign aid. Empirical evidence suggests that bilateral aid is associated with
the membership in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the alignment in votes in
the UN General Assembly [Alesina and Dollar, 2000, Dreher et al., 2008, Kuziemko
20The signature of a DTA with a major capital exporter can be an important event for a
capital importer, who may alter its corporate income tax rate, so that we cannot exclude an
endogeneity bias in our estimation here
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and Werker, 2006]. To account for UNSC membership we construct the variable
UNSCmembership as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if two countries
of a country-pair are simultaneously members of the UN Security Council (Table
5 in the Annex lists the cases). The variable is not statistically significant (see
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8). Also agreement in the UN General Assembly
(UNGA agreement) between the two countries of a country-pair turns out not to
be associated with bilateral aid commitments in our regressions (see Column (3)).
Columns (4) to (7) of Table 8 then include alternative variables to account
for the four P’s: poverty, population, policies, and proximity. First, we use the
(logged) life expectancy to account for the recipient country’s poverty level (see
Column (4) in Table 8). Akin to the recipient country’s GDP per capita in most
regressions, also this variable yields no statistically significant impact on ODA
payments in our sample.
Second, we include the size of the donor and recipient countries as measured in
terms of the (logged) GDP in constant USD. Both GDP donor(ln) and GDP reci-
pient(ln) enter the regression with a positive sign and similar significance patterns
as population, leaving the main results qualitatively unchanged (see Column (5)
in Table 8).
Third, the institutional quality in the recipient country in accounted for with
a different index. In Column (6) in Table 8, we take the index of democracy pro-
vided by the Center for Systemic Peace, which classifies countries from ”strongly
autocratic” to ”strongly democratic” (Democracy polity). As the democracy in-
dex used in the other regressions, this variable is not statistically significant at
conventional levels.
Forth, Column 7 uses bilateral FDI stocks relative to the sum of the two coun-
tries’ GDPs (FDI/GDP(ln)) instead of the bilateral relative trade volume as a
measure of economic proximity. Similar to the bilateral relative trade volume,
also the relative bilateral FDI stocks do not show a significant effect on ODA
commitments.
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Most importantly, the main variable of interest, DTA(0), remains positive and
statistically significant at conventional levels in all regressions. The size of the
effect varies around 22%, with the relatively low effect of 18.6% (with a corre-
sponding p-value of 0.066) in Column (3) probably due to the small sample size
in this regression.
8 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed, both theoretically and empirically, the connection be-
tween bilateral foreign aid and double tax agreements. We theoretically claim that
in asymmetric situations, where one country is predominantly a capital exporter
and the other country a capital importer, a DTA is mutually beneficial if and only
if there is compensation for the capital importer, that loses tax base, by the capital
exporter. We claim that such a compensation can be given in the form of official
development assistance. This need not be the sole form of compensation.
We have tested this hypothesis in a dyadic panel with fixed effects poisson
regression analysis. We have found that recipient countries that sign a DTA with
donor countries indeed receive about 22% more foreign aid in the signature year.
We can also empirically confirm further predictions of the model.
This paper however can only analyze the patterns emerging from macro data
and interpret them in a meaningful and convincing way, and thereby reach rather
indirect conclusions about the connections between foreign aid and DTA conclu-
sion. It would be insightful to have access to information that enables researchers
to analyze how treaties are actually negotiated. At the moment, little is known
about the actual negotiation process as DTAs are still mainly negotiated behind
closed doors [e.g. Lang, 2012]. Likewise, there is limited information about aid
allocation and bargaining processes between donor and recipient countries [e.g.
Molenaers et al., 2015].
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Table 3: DAC Member Countries as of 2012
Australia Greece Norway
Austria Ireland Portugal
Belgium Italy Spain
Canada Japan Sweden
Denmark Rep. of Korea Switzerland
Finland Luxembourg United Kingdom
France The Netherlands United States
Germany New Zealand
Notes: Even though a DAC member since 1961, the European Union is disregarded as a donor
in our analysis. Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia joined the DAC
in 2013.
source: www.oecd.org/dac
Table 4: Recipient countries included in the analysis
Albania (12) Guinea (1) Nepal (3)
Algeria (9) Guyana (1) Nigeria (2)
Argentina (11) India (9) Pakistan (4)
Armenia (9) Indonesia (4) Panama (4)
Azerbaijan (10) Iran (4) Papua New Guinea (3)
Bangladesh (5) Jordan (5) Peru (2)
Belarus (6) Kazakhstan (9) Philippines (2)
Belize (1) Kenya (1) Rwanda (1)
Bolivia (5) Kiribati (1) Senegal (3)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2) Kyrgyz Republic (5) Serbia (6)
Botswana (3) Lao PDR (2) South Africa (19)
Brazil (1) Lebanon (1) Syrian Arab Republic (2)
China (5) Lesotho (1) Tajikistan (2)
Colombia (4) Libya (2) Tanzania (1)
Cuba (2) Macedonia, FYR (9) Thailand (7)
Ecuador (5) Malawi (1) Tunisia (5)
Egypt (5) Malaysia (3) Uganda (3)
El Salvador (1) Mauritius (3) Ukraine (11)
Ethiopia(3) Moldova (5) Uzbekistan (10)
Rep Fiji (1) Mongolia (10) Venezuela (13)
Gabon (3) Montenegro (1) (1) Vietnam (18)
Gambia (2) Morocco (4) Zimbabwe (2)
Georgia (8) Mozambique (1)
Ghana (6) Namibia (3)
Notes: Number in brackets shows number of DTAs signed and included in the analysis.
Source: www.oecd.org/dac, IBFD Tax Research Platform
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Table 5: Both countries concurrently members of the UN Security Council
France-Algeria 2004&2005 France-Vietnam 2008&2009
France-Azerbaijan 2012 France-Zimbabwe 1991&1992
France-Botswana 1995&1996 U.K.-Argentina 1994&1995, 1999&2000, 2005&2006, 2012
France-Gabon 1998&1999, 2010&2011 U .K.-Botswana 1995&1996
France-Ghana 2006&2007 U.K.-Ghana 2006&2007
France-Guinea 2002&2003 U.K.-India 1991&1992, 2011&2012
France-India 1991&1992, 2002&2006 U.K.-Libya 2008&2009
France-Jamaica 2000&2001 U.K.-South Africa 2007&2008, 2011&2012
France-Kenya 1997&1998 U.K.-Uganda 2009&2010
France-Libya 2008&2009 U.K.-Ukraine 2000&2001
France-Namibia 1999&2000 U.K.-Venezuela, RB 1992&1993
France-Panama 2007&2008 U.K.-Vietnam 2008&2009
France-South Africa 2007&2008, 2011&2012 U.S.-South Africa 2007&2008, 2011&2012
France-Syrian Arab Republic 2002&2003 U.S.-Ukraine 2000&2001
France-Venezuela, RB 1992&1993 U.S.-Venezuela, RB 1992&1993
Source: Dreher et al. [2009a]
Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total ODA commitment 27.365 98.862 0 4284.81 7006
POP donor(ln) 16.653 1.326 12.866 19.565 7006
POP recipient(ln) 16.679 1.616 11.189 21.024 7006
GDP donor(ln) 27.047 1.152 23.685 30.259 7006
GDP recipient(ln) 23.989 1.72 17.985 29.065 7006
GDPPC recipient(ln) 7.322 0.941 4.717 9.116 7006
LifeExpectancy recipient(ln) 4.198 0.116 3.299 4.37 7013
Democracy freedom 7.771 3.251 2 14 7006
Democracy polity 2.123 6.451 -9 10 6920
Bilateral Trade(ln) -23.054 15.426 -44.096 -3.508 7006
Bilateral FDI(ln) -7.469 8.73 -13.816 10.662 6941
Corporate tax 0.331 0.067 0.2 0.58 7006
Natural Catastrophe 7.386 5.886 0 19.65 7006
UNSC membership 0.01 0.102 0 1 7006
UNGA agreement 0.74 0.119 0.104 1 6384
Investment treaty 0.597 0.49 0 1 7006
Trade agreement 0.114 0.318 0 1 7006
DTA 0.605 0.489 0 1 7006
DTA(0) 0.047 0.211 0 1 7006
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Table 7: Variable Description
ODA commitments Total Bilateral Official Development
Assistance commitments in constant
2014 USD
OECD International Development
Statistics, DAC database
DTA Binary variable taking the value 1 in
the year of the signature of a Double
Tax Agreeement
IBFD Tax Research Platform
POP donor(ln) logged population of the donor country World Bank World Development Indi-
cators
POP recipient(ln) logged population of the recipient
country
World Bank World Development Indi-
cators
GDP donor(ln) logged GDP of the donor country in
const 2005 USD
World Bank World Development Indi-
cators
GDP recipient(ln) logged GDP of the recipient country in
const 2005 USD
World Bank World Development Indi-
cators
GDPPC recipient(ln) logged GDP per capita of the recipient
country in const 2005 USD
World Bank World Development Indi-
cators
Bilateral FDI (ln) Bilateral FDI stock between the two
countries of a country-pair in constant
2015 USD (converted from current
USD to constant USD with US GDP
deflator(taken from WDI database))
OECD Foreign Direct Investment
Statistics
Bilateral Trade(ln) Bilateral trade volume between two
countries in constant 2015 USD (con-
verted from current USD to constant
USD with US GDP deflator(taken from
WDI database)) i and j
United Nations International Trade
Statistics (UN COMTRADE)
Democracy freedom Inverted sum of the civil liberty index
and the political rights index in the re-
cipient country, ranging from 0 to 15,
with higher values referring to higher
levels of democracy
Freedom House https://www.
freedomhouse.org/report-types/
freedom-world
Democracy polity Measure of democracy in the recipient
country, ranging from -10 (strongly au-
tocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)
Polity IV dataset version 2015
¡p4v2015 and p4v2015d
UNGA agreement Index measuring agreement in UN
General Assembly votes
Streshnev and Voeten [2013]
UNSC membership binary variable taking the value 1 if
both countries of a country-pair are
concurrently members of the UN Secu-
rity Council
Dreher et al. [2009a]
Natural Catastrophe (logged) total number of persons af-
fected by a natural catastrophe (sum
of injured, homeless, and affected per-
sons)
EM-DAT database http://www.emdat.
be/
Life Expectancy recipient Life expectancy at birth, total years
(logged), in the recipient country
World Bank, World Development Indi-
cators
Corporate tax Tax Rate on Corporate Profits IBFD Tax Research Platform
Investment treaty Binary variable taking the value 1 in
the year of the signature of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty
UNCTAD United Nations http:
//investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
IIA
Trade agreement Binary variable taking the value 1 in
the year of the signature of a Preferen-
tial Trade Agreement
World Trade Organization https:
//www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
region_e/rta_participation_map_e.
htm
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Table 8: Robustness Regression Results 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
POP donor(ln) 5.094** 5.001** 5.050** 4.587** 5.796*** 4.692**
(2.116) (2.072) (1.996) (2.178) (2.110) (2.048)
POP recipient(ln) 0.159 0.110 0.417 0.215 0.089 0.070
(0.741) (0.743) (0.740) (0.828) (0.741) (0.725)
GDPPC recipient(ln) 0.236 0.240 0.459* 0.102 0.323 0.217
(0.262) (0.258) (0.268) (0.730) (0.252) (0.285)
Bilateral trade (ln) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Democracy freedom 0.029 0.029 0.012 0.031 0.017 0.030
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Investment treaty 0.279** 0.284** 0.293** 0.306*** 0.310** 0.298** 0.322***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.127) (0.118) (0.121) (0.127) (0.113)
Trade agreement 0.008 0.009 0.037 -0.021 0.041 0.059 0.008
(0.203) (0.203) (0.201) (0.206) (0.196) (0.205) (0.188)
DTA(-3) 0.022 0.027 -0.023 0.021 0.009 0.046 0.026
(0.142) (0.142) (0.149) (0.143) (0.137) (0.150) (0.143)
DTA(-2) -0.138 -0.142 -0.171 -0.139 -0.141 -0.130 -0.163
(0.145) (0.145) (0.153) (0.147) (0.148) (0.150) (0.161)
DTA(-1) -0.032 -0.034 -0.060 -0.034 -0.027 -0.017 -0.017
(0.124) (0.125) (0.131) (0.129) (0.121) (0.138) (0.130)
DTA(0) 0.218** 0.224** 0.189* 0.217** 0.229** 0.233** 0.127*
(0.092) (0.091) (0.100) (0.095) (0.094) (0.091) (0.072)
DTA(+1) 0.064 0.070 0.049 0.058 0.075 0.095 0.067
(0.119) (0.118) (0.123) (0.125) (0.123) (0.118) (0.118)
DTA(+2) 0.022 0.028 0.007 0.017 0.034 0.045 0.065
(0.077) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.069)
DTA(+3) 0.131 0.133 0.112 0.121 0.134 0.154* 0.138
(0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.092) (0.086) (0.091)
Natural Catastrophe 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
UNSC Membership 0.241 0.204
(0.186) (0.179)
UNGA Agreement -0.479
(0.565)
LifeExpectancy recipient(ln) -0.703
(1.012)
GDP donor(ln) 2.536***
(0.722)
GDP recipient(ln) 0.074
(0.705)
Democracy polity -0.007
(0.014)
ln(fdi/gdp) -0.002
(0.003)
Observations 7,006 7,006 6,384 7,013 7,006 6,920 6,614
Number of groups 327 327 320 327 327 323 327
Wald chi2 247.47 253.68 231.47 230.86 261.21 235.80 248.26
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo Log-likelihood -72,510.19 -72,344.41 -66,968.64 -71,834.57 -71,636.62 -71,467.04 -69,854.63
Notes: Estimated with Poisson Maximum Likelihood Fixed Effects. The dependent variable is total bilateral
ODA commitments; all explanatory variables are lagged by one period (except for Natural Catastrophe and
UNSC Membership); all regressions include country-pair FE, year FE, and a constant; robust standard errors in
parentheses; time period 1991 - 2012; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Robustness Regression Results 2: Exclusion of Greece and Korea
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
POP donor(ln) 4.936** 4.839** 5.120** 4.464** 5.663*** 4.565**
(2.151) (2.107) (2.026) (2.224) (2.139) (2.096)
POP recipient(ln) 0.312 0.262 0.574 0.388 0.268 0.217
(0.722) (0.726) (0.726) (0.808) (0.717) (0.712)
GDPPC recipient(ln) 0.217 0.220 0.442 0.017 0.308 0.190
(0.277) (0.273) (0.282) (0.729) (0.265) (0.302)
Bilateral trade (ln) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Democracy freedom 0.028 0.029 0.011 0.031 0.021 0.031
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Investment treaty 0.297** 0.302** 0.323** 0.325*** 0.306** 0.315** 0.335***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.127) (0.119) (0.126) (0.129) (0.114)
Trade agreement 0.043 0.044 0.064 0.015 0.043 0.094 0.051
(0.206) (0.206) (0.205) (0.208) (0.197) (0.209) (0.189)
DTA(-3) 0.029 0.034 -0.036 0.029 0.017 0.053 0.034
(0.146) (0.146) (0.153) (0.147) (0.141) (0.153) (0.148)
DTA(-2) -0.143 -0.149 -0.179 -0.146 -0.145 -0.136 -0.167
(0.148) (0.148) (0.156) (0.150) (0.151) (0.154) (0.165)
DTA(-1) -0.032 -0.035 -0.066 -0.034 -0.030 -0.017 -0.012
(0.122) (0.123) (0.129) (0.127) (0.120) (0.135) (0.127)
DTA(0) 0.217** 0.224** 0.186* 0.216** 0.227** 0.233** 0.127*
(0.093) (0.092) (0.101) (0.097) (0.096) (0.093) (0.072)
DTA(+1) 0.053 0.060 0.034 0.048 0.060 0.085 0.054
(0.121) (0.120) (0.124) (0.126) (0.127) (0.120) (0.120)
DTA(+2) 0.014 0.020 0.004 0.017 0.022 0.040 0.061
(0.077) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.070)
DTA(+3) 0.117 0.119 0.108 0.117 0.118 0.142 0.127
(0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.089) (0.094)
Natural Catastrophe 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
UNSC Membership 0.253 0.218
(0.185) (0.178)
UNGA Agreement -0.312
(0.602)
LifeExpectancy recipient(ln) -0.685
(1.039)
GDP donor(ln) 2.097***
(0.810)
GDP recipient(ln) 0.153
(0.699)
Democracy polity -0.008
(0.014)
ln(fdi/gdp) -0.002
(0.003)
Observations 6,182 6,182 5,621 6,197 6,182 6,096 5,862
Number of groups 289 289 283 289 289 285 289
Wald chi2 234.96 236.50 222.86 221.44 240.99 226.77 236.92
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo Log-likelihood -67,073.88 -66,891.45 -62,099.56 -66,534.48 -67,062.91 -66,041.74 -64,603.68
Notes: Estimated with Poisson Maximum Likelihood Fixed Effects. The dependent variable is total bilateral
ODA commitments; all explanatory variables are lagged by one period (except for Natural Catastrophe and
UNSC Membership); all regressions include country-pair FE, year FE, and a constant; robust standard errors in
parentheses; time period 1991 - 2012; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
39
